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Abstract: The European labor market allows for the border-free mobility of workers across 31 countries
that cover most of the continent’s population. However, rates of migration across European countries
remain considerably lower than interstate migration in the United States, and spatial variation in terms
of unemployment or income levels is larger. We document patterns of migration in Europe, which include
a sizable migration from east to west in the last twenty years. An analysis of worker-level microdata
provides some evidence for an international convergence in wage rates and for modest static gains from
migration. We conclude by discussing obstacles to migration that reduce the potential for further labor
market integration in Europe.
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T he Treaty of Rome, signed in 1957 by Belgium, France, Italy, Luxem-bourg, the Netherlands, and West Germany, envisioned the development of a common market with free movement of goods, capital, services and 
persons. Today, legal barriers to labor mobility across European countries have 
been dismantled: more than 460 million citizens of 31 European countries can 
choose to reside in any other partner country, they can work there without needing 
a work permit, and they are entitled to equal treatment with nationals in access to 
employment and public services. 
However, the European labor market remains considerably less integrated 
and more heterogeneous than the US labor market, which comprises a popula-
tion of 330 million across the 50 states. For example, consider the dispersion of 
unemployment rates. In 2019, national unemployment rates in European countries 
were as low as 2.0 percent in Czechia and 3.2 percent in Germany, but as high as 
13.7 percent in Spain and 16.6 percent in Greece (Eurostat 2020a). By comparison, 
state-level unemployment rates within the United States ranged from 2.4 percent 
to 6.1 percent (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2019). The European labor market also 
has much lower levels of spatial mobility. The share of European citizens living 
in a different country than their country of birth was less than 5 percent in 2019 
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(Eurostat 2020b), while the fraction of cross-state migrants in the US population has 
long been close to one-third (Molloy, Smith, and Wozniak 2011). However, whereas 
domestic mobility in the United States appears to be slowly declining, it is increasing 
in the European labor market.
The removal of restrictions to international migration has very large potential 
economic benefits, which may exceed the benefits of other integration measures 
such as free trade by an order of magnitude (Clemens 2011; Dustmann and Preston 
2019). Nonetheless, European labor market integration remains a contentious 
policy issue. Skepticism about immigration is a signature issue of right-wing Euro-
pean populism (Margalit 2019; Guiso et al. 2020) and is also strongly correlated 
with general distrust towards the European Union (  Jeannet 2017). 
In this article, we discuss the past, present, and potential future of the European 
labor market. We begin by documenting patterns of labor mobility across Euro-
pean countries. We next ask whether and to what extent the labor markets of these 
countries have become more integrated over time. Finally, we discuss remaining 
obstacles for European labor market integration. Our primary focus is on migration 
between European countries: for surveys of the literature on overall immigration in 
Europe, useful starting points are Dustmann and Frattini (2011) and De La Rica, 
Glitz, and Ortega (2015). 
Labor Market Integration in Europe
In the Treaty of Rome, the six founding members of the European Economic 
Community agreed on the free movement of citizens within those countries, thus 
extending to the entire economy the labor-mobility agreement for the coal and 
steel industries that had been introduced by the 1951 Treaty of Paris. The Schengen 
Agreement of 1985 further led to the fall of national border controls, which facili-
tated cross-border work.1 However, despite a harmonization of visa policies, each 
country maintained the right to apply its own rules for the provision of work visas to 
citizens of countries that do not participate in the common market.
In successive enlargements, six additional Western European countries joined 
the European Economic Community (EEC): the United Kingdom, Ireland, and 
Denmark in 1973, Greece in 1981, and Portugal and Spain in 1986. In addition, 
East Germany was integrated into the bloc following the German unification in 
1990. The 1992 Treaty of Maastricht established the European Union (EU), whose 
goal was a closer political integration among the EEC members, including the 
establishment of EU citizenship. In the same year, the twelve members of the EEC 
and the seven members of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) signed an 
1 All but six of the countries that eventually participated in the common European labor market, also 
became part of the Schengen area. The United Kingdom and Ireland opted out of joining the Schengen 
agreement, while some of the newest members of the European market in southeastern Europe are 
obliged to join in the future.
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agreement to expand the common market beyond the EEC/EU by forming the 
European Economic Area (EEA), which covered nearly all of Western Europe. The 
EU and EEA then expanded eastwards and added a further 13 countries from 2004 
onwards.2 
Thus, since its foundation, the common European Economic Area labor 
market grew from six countries with a population of 167 million in 1957 to 32 coun-
tries with a population of about 530 million in 2020. We will refer to these countries 
as “EEA countries,” and include Switzerland in that group, which participates in 
the common market despite not being an EEA member, and the United Kingdom, 
which left the common market in 2021. Prior to “Brexit,” which reduced the expanse 
of the European labor market for the first time, the common market included all 
countries on the European continent, except most of the successor countries of the 
USSR and of Yugoslavia, as well as Turkey, Albania, and some micro-states. 
The changing membership in the European Economic Area had large impli-
cations for the dispersion of the material standard of living among member states. 
Figure 1 ranks the EEA population by the real per capita income of their country 
of residence and shows the difference between the EEA resident at the 5th versus 
the 95th percentile: In 1958, an Italian resident was at the 5th and a German at the 
95th percentile; in 2016, a Romanian was at the 5th while someone from Holland 
was at the 95th percentile.3 The figure indicates that per capita income differ-
entials—indicated by the 95/5 percentile ratio—have increased over time. The 
95/5 percentile ratio expanded from 1.19 to 1.85 with the accession of Spain and 
Portugal in 1986, and later jumped to 2.82 and 3.47 following the eastern enlarge-
ments of 2004 and 2007, respectively. For comparison, the 95/5 percentile ratio 
among US states was 1.86 in 2018, with New York and South Carolina being the 
states at the 95th and 5th percentiles, respectively. 
The eastern enlargement of the European Union and the resulting sharp 
increase in income differentials within the common labor market created the 
potential for substantial migration from poorer to richer countries. Most older 
2 Depending on data availability, we will subsequently report statistics for the following country groups: 
“EU-15” comprises the twelve European countries that had already been members of the EEC by 1986 
(Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom), plus three countries that joined the EEA in 1994 as members of EFTA 
and subsequently acceded to the European Union in 1995 (Austria, Finland, Sweden); “EFTA” comprises 
three EFTA members which joined the EEA in 1994 or 1995 (Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway), and 
one that rejected an accession to the EEA in a referendum but later joined the common market via 
bilateral treaties in 2005 (Switzerland); “EU-28” comprises the EU-15 plus 13 countries that joined the 
European Union in 2004 (Cyprus, Czechia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, 
Slovenia), in 2007 (Bulgaria and Romania) or in 2013 (Croatia); and “EU-27” is the same set of countries 
minus the United Kingdom following its exit from the European Union in 2021. 
3 When Greece joined the European Union in 1981, it became the poorest country among existing 
member states, but its population comprised less than 5 percent of EU residents. In 1986, Spain replaced 
Italy at the 5th percentile position, before that spot was taken over by Greece in 1990. From 2004 onwards, 
several Eastern European countries (Poland, Bulgaria, and Romania) held the 5th percentile spot. The 
95th percentile position was usually held by Germany or the Netherlands, with brief interruptions by 
Austria, Ireland, Sweden, and Denmark.
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member states, led by Germany and Austria who are in close proximity to the new 
Eastern European entrant countries, initially imposed rules that restricted the 
access of workers from new members states to their labor markets for a transitional 
period of up to seven years (Fihel et al. 2015). Only the United Kingdom, Ireland, 
and Sweden immediately opened up their labor markets in 2004, and these coun-
tries received large inflows of Eastern European citizens as a consequence. 
Patterns of Migration
To document the extent of migration within Europe over longer time periods, 
we first look at Germany, the largest and wealthiest of the six EEC countries. We 
then take a closer look at migration patterns all over Europe since the year 2000 
Source: Author’s calculation based on data from Bolt and van Zanden (2020). 
Note: The figure shows the distribution of real GDP per capita across countries that in a given year were 
part of the common European labor market through membership in what was the European Economic 
Community and has evolved into the European Economic Area. Diamonds indicate the median value 
of the population-weighted distribution, while whiskers indicate the range between the 5th and 95th 
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Figure 1 
Income Dispersion among Countries in the Common European Labor Market
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when within-EU migration flows started to surge. Finally we show that since 2000, 
within-EU migration has become increasingly high-skilled.
Immigration into Germany since the 1960s
Figure 2 depicts the annual inflow of immigrants into Germany since the mid-
1950s. It indicates that sizable immigration commenced in the early 1960s, when 
“guest workers” were attracted to fill labor shortages in the booming “Wirtschafts-
wunder” economy.  During the 1960s and early 1970s, Germany was the leading 
destination of migrants from within the European Economic Community, while 
Italy was the most important origin country of these within-EEC migrants (Straub-
haar 1988). However, many immigrants to Germany during the 1960s and 1970s 
originated from countries that were yet to join the EEC, such as Spain. From the 
1970s onwards, a large fraction of immigrants also came from countries that never 
became part of the European labor market, such as Turkey. Immigration within 
the European Economic Area increased rapidly only after 2011, when the citizens 
of the Eastern European countries that had joined the European Union in 2004 
gained full access to the German labor market following the expiry of the seven-year 
Figure 2 
Annual Inflows of Foreign Citizens into Germany
Source: International Migration Institute (2015), Statistisches Bundesamt (2020a) 
Note: “Contemporary EU” indicates inflows of foreign nationals who were citizens of a country that was a 
member of the EEC/EU in the indicated year. “EU-28” indicates inflows of foreigners who were citizens 
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transitional arrangements. In 2015, a continuously high inflow of migrants from 
Eastern Europe and a wave of refugees, primarily from Syria, led to a record immi-
gration of two million individuals in a single year.4 
Migration to and within Europe since the 2000s
The fact that inter-European migration increased strongly in recent years, as 
shown for the German case in Figure 2, motivates us to take a closer look at the last 
two decades. Column 1 of Table 1 reports the fraction of foreign nationals in the 
2019 population of each country in the European Economic Area (except Liech-
tenstein), with countries listed in descending order of their 2015 GDP per capita. 
The second and third columns separate this total into the proportion of EU-27 and 
non-EU-27 foreigners in a country. The fourth column indicates the number of a 
country’s citizens that reside in another EEA country, expressed as a percentage of 
the source country’s domestic population.5 
The table illustrates that immigrant stocks are positively correlated with coun-
tries’ income levels: for example, the share of foreign nationals in the domestic 
population is largest in Luxembourg (47.5 percent) and Switzerland (25.1 percent), 
which are among the countries with highest incomes per capita worldwide. Many of 
the poorer Eastern European members have small foreigner shares in their popu-
lations, such as 0.6 percent in Romania and 0.8 percent in Poland. The contrast 
becomes stronger still if one focuses only on foreigners with EU citizenship in 
column 2 of Table 1. The destinations of international migrants within the EEA 
are almost entirely the higher-income countries of Western Europe. Instead, most 
of the foreign citizens living in the eastern countries of the European Economic 
Area come from non-EU nations, such as Russians residing in Estonia or Bosnians 
in Slovenia. 
The patterns for emigrants, shown in column 4 of Table 1, are opposite to 
those for immigrants. Emigrants from Eastern Europe account for a large portion 
of citizens living in a different EEA country. Most strikingly, roughly one of every 
five Romanian citizens in the European Economic Area—a total of 3.6 million indi-
viduals—is living outside of Romania. Some of the southern member states, like 
Portugal or Greece, also have large diasporas elsewhere in Europe. By contrast, 
wealthier countries of Western Europe, like Germany or the United Kingdom, have 
relatively few of their citizens living abroad, at least compared to the much larger 
number of EEA and non-EEA foreigners that these countries host.
4 Historically consistent time series for migration inflows are available for Germany and the Netherlands, 
but not for the other two largest founding members of the European Economic Community: France and 
Italy. Online Appendix Figure A1 shows time-series data on immigration to the Netherlands, which are 
similar to those for immigration to Germany.
5 There are more comprehensive European migration statistics based on individuals’ nationality rather 
than their country of birth. In 2018, 86 percent of the foreign nationals residing in EU-15/EFTA coun-
tries were born abroad. That fraction is lower in most Eastern member states, and as low as 49 percent 
in Bulgaria and Lithuania (Eurostat 2020). Data on a country’s emigrants is available only for those who 
reside in European Economic Area countries, but not for those who moved to a non-EU country.
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Table 1 
Foreign Citizens Residing in EEA Countries in 2019 and Change in Foreign 
Citizens Residing in EEA Countries, 2004 to 2019
Foreign citizens living in a country, in 
percent of country’s population, 2019
Country’s citizens 
living in other EU 
country, in per-
cent of country’s 
population, 2019
Change %pts of foreign 












(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
I. Countries with per capita income above EU average
Luxembourg 47.5 40.1  7.4  5.5 5.8 1.9
Switzerland 25.1 16.5  8.6  1.1 4.8 –0.1
Ireland 12.5  9.2  3.3  8.4 1.0 –0.1
Norway 11.0  6.8  4.2  1.6 4.3 1.5
Iceland 12.4 10.5  1.9  7.4 4.9 0.1
Denmark  9.1  3.9  5.2  2.4 2.6 1.4
Netherlands  6.4  3.3  3.1  3.4 1.9 0.2
Sweden  9.1  3.1  6.0  2.0 0.8 3.0
Austria 16.2  8.2  8.0  3.0 5.7 1.3
Finland  4.7  1.8  2.9  2.5 1.1 1.5
Germany 12.2  5.3  6.9  1.5 2.3 1.0
Belgium 12.3  8.0  4.3  2.5 2.3 1.7
United Kingdom  9.3  5.5  3.8  1.4 3.5 0.6
France  7.3  2.4  4.9  1.4 0.4 1.1
Italy  8.7  2.6  6.1  3.4 2.0 3.3
Malta 16.9  9.2  7.7  2.5 6.8 6.0
Spain 10.3  4.2  6.1  1.7 2.1 1.4
II. Countries with per capita income below EU average
Cyprus 17.8 13.4  4.3  3.9 6.2 0.1
Slovenia  6.6  1.0  5.6  3.6 0.9 3.5
Estonia 15.1  1.6 13.5  7.0 1.1 –3.6
Czechia  5.2  2.2  3.1  1.6 1.5 1.8
Portugal  4.7  1.5  3.1 14.3 0.6 –0.1
Lithuania  1.7  0.3  1.4 15.8 0.2 0.5
Slovakia  1.4  1.1  0.3  6.7 0.8 0.0
Greece  7.8  2.0  5.8  4.8 0.6 –0.8
Latvia 13.9  0.3 13.6 10.9 0.1 –8.5
Hungary  1.8  0.8  1.1  4.8 0.0 0.5
Poland  0.8  0.1  0.7  6.9 0.0 0.6
Croatia  1.7  0.4  1.2 13.6 0.2 0.7
Romania  0.6  0.3  0.3 18.4 0.2 0.0
Bulgaria  1.4  0.1  1.3 12.7 0.0 0.9
Source: Eurostat (2020c, 2020d, 2020e).
Note: Countries are listed in declining order of GDP per capita in 2019. The stock of foreign nationals 
living in a country (separately reported for EU-27 and non-EU-27 citizens) and the stock of a country’s 
own citizens living elsewhere in the European Union are each reported as percentages of a country’s 
current domestic population. For some countries, data on foreign citizens in the domestic population is 
unavailable for 2004, and data from the next available year is used instead. 
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The final two columns of Table 1 indicate the change in a country’s immigrant 
share between 2004 and 2019, again differentiated by EU and non-EU citizens. It 
shows that immigrant shares increased in all but two countries, with several coun-
tries experiencing a growth of their foreign population share by 5 percentage points 
or more. The only exceptions are Latvia and Estonia, which saw many Russian 
nationals gain citizenship or returning to their home country. It is noteworthy 
that immigration from other EU countries was the main contributor to growing 
foreigner shares in most countries, especially those in Western Europe. Most of the 
European Union’s Eastern member states only experienced modest increases in 
foreign population shares, which were often due to immigrants from outside the 
European Union, such as Ukrainians moving to Poland. Overall, the patterns of 
Table 1 clearly suggest intra-European labor flows from poorer to richer European 
countries, and especially from east to west.
We further investigate the regional patterns of immigrants’ location choices 
in the Western European countries that are the main recipients of immigration in 
Europe. Figure 3 plots the nationality of the main foreigner group in a geographic 
region in the years 2018–19 based on data that we collected from individual coun-
tries. Our data set comprises 1,095 “NUTS-3” regions, as defined by the European 
Union.6 There are 53 different nationalities that form the predominant group of 
foreigners in at least one of these 1,095 regions. Figure 3 does not try to display all 
of these nationalities separately, but indicates to which of seven different country 
groups the main foreign nationality belongs. 
The blue areas of Figure 3 show that within many regions of Austria, Switzer-
land, France, Belgium and Luxembourg, the predominant foreigner group comes 
from an EU-15 or EFTA country, most often Portugal, Germany, Italy, or France. 
Out of the 15 countries that were part of the European Union prior to its eastern 
enlargement, each one accounts for the main group of foreigners in at least one 
region of another country. 
If one looks at the blue, dark green, and light green areas, it is clear that in 
a majority of regions, the largest group of foreign nationals comes from another 
country within the European Economic Area. The dark green areas show that for 
a strikingly large number of regions, the main foreigner group hails from one of 
the countries that joined the European Union since 2004. Polish nationals form the 
largest immigrant group in most of the British Isles, and in parts of Scandinavia, 
Germany, and the Netherlands. In many regions of Italy and Spain, as well as in 
some areas of Austria and Southern Germany, the largest foreign groups instead are 
the citizens of Romania, which joined the European Union in 2007 and became the 
second most populous Eastern member state behind Poland.
6 NUTS is an acronym for Nomenclature des Unités Territoriales Statistiques (Nomenclature of Terri-
torial Units for Statistics), which is a hierarchical system of geographic regions that Eurostat uses for 
statistical purposes. The NUTS-3 units are defined as “small regions” that usually comprise populations 
between 150,000 and 800,000 individuals. 
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Finally, the red, pink, orange, and gray areas on Figure 3 show regions where 
the main foreign nationality comes from a non-EEA country. In many regions of 
Germany, the Netherlands and southern Sweden, the dominant foreigner groups are 
Turkish or Syrian nationals, where the latter group includes many recently arrived 
refugees. Immigrants from North Africa, especially from Morocco and Algeria, 
form sizable communities in the Mediterranean countries Spain and France and to 
a lesser extent in Italy. Other source countries of immigrants that play a dominant 
role in a few regions include Brazilians in Portugal, Russians in Finland, Albanians 
in Italy, and Indians and Pakistanis in the United Kingdom.
EU-15/EFTA
EU eastern enlargement 2004
EU eastern enlargement 2007
Non-EU Eastern Europe




Origin Regions of Largest Foreign Nationality by NUTS-3 Geographic Region
Source: All data is sourced from individual countries’ statistical offices: Centraal Bureau vor de Statistiek 
(Netherlands) (2020a), Central Statistics Office (Ireland) (2017b), Danmarks Statistik (Denmark) (2020), 
Fundação Francisco Manuel dos Santos (Portugal) (2020), Hagstofa Islands (Iceland) (2020), Insituto 
Nacional de Estadística (Spain) (2020), Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques 
(France) (2020), Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques du Grand-Duché de 
Luxembourg (2020), Istituto Nazionale di Statistica (Italy) (2020), Office for National Statistics (United 
Kingdom) (2018a), Secrétariat d’etat aux migrations (Switzerland) (2020), Statbel (Belgium) (2020), 
Statistisches Bundesamt (Germany) (2020b), Statistik Austria (2020), Statistisk Sentralbyra (Norway) 
(2020), Statistiska Centralbyran (Sweden) (2020a), Tilastokeskus (Finland) (2020). © EuroGeographics 
for map with administrative boundaries.
Notes: The figure indicates the source region of the largest foreign nationality residing in each of 1,095 
NUTS-3 regions of Western Europe, or in more aggregate NUTS-1 regions for Scotland and Northern 
Ireland. Population counts by nationality are measured on December 31, 2018, or January 1, 2019, if 
available, or at the latest available date otherwise. 
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What explains the location choices of different foreign nationalities that move 
to Western Europe? We investigated the choice of destination countries for the nine 
immigrant nationalities whose numbers in Western Europe grew the most between 
2001 and 2018: Romania, Morocco, Syria, Poland, China, Bulgaria, Ukraine, 
Albania, and Russia. The nine panels of online Appendix Figure A2, available with 
this article at the JEP website, plot separately for each of these nationalities their 
initial percentage in the population of Western European countries in 2001, and 
the net inflow into these countries between 2001 and 2018. 
For most immigrant nationalities, the initial stock and subsequent inflow to a 
destination country are positively correlated, which implies that immigrants tend to 
locate in countries that already host a sizable diaspora of the same nationality. This 
is the case, in particular, for non-European immigrants: Syrians moved primarily to 
Sweden and Germany, which already hosted relatively large proportions of Syrians in 
2001, while Belgium remained a popular destination for immigrants from Morocco, 
and Italy for immigrants from China.7 
Geographic distance also plays an apparent role in migrants’ destination 
choices. For three of the nine main migrant nationalities, the net inflow from 2001 
to 2018 was largest in the geographically closest Western European country, with 
Moroccans moving to Spain, Albanians moving to Italy, and Russians moving to 
Finland. Language distance arguably had a less important influence, because none 
of the nine sending countries shares a national language with a Western European 
country. However, Romanians did often move to Italy and Spain, whose languages 
are related to Romanian.
A particularly interesting pattern of migration is that for citizens of Poland, 
which is the largest Eastern European country that joined the European Union. 
In 2001, the share of Polish nationals was largest in Germany and Austria, the 
two Western European countries that are geographically closest to Poland. When 
Poland and other eastern European countries joined the European Union in 2004, 
Germany and Austria imposed transitional arrangements that deferred the opening 
of their labor markets to the new Eastern EU members to 2011. The only countries 
that immediately opened their labor markets to Eastern Europeans in 2004 were 
the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Sweden, while several other countries including 
Norway opened their markets in 2006. As a consequence of this staggered access 
to Western European labor markets, the largest net inflows of Polish immigrants 
relative to domestic population occurred in three countries that hosted few Polish 
nationals in 2001 but opened their markets early: Ireland, Norway, and the United 
Kingdom. Perhaps guided by that experience, these three countries no longer 
immediately allowed unrestricted immigration when Romania and Bulgaria joined 
7 An extreme counterexample to this pattern is the location choice of Ukrainians, whose net inflow was 
largest in Portugal, which was the country with lowest population share of that nationality in 2001. The 
number of Ukrainian citizens registered in Portugal grew from 71 individuals in 1996 to 62,448 indi-
viduals in 2002 (Fonseca and Pereira 2016). Most of these migrants benefited from a 2001 immigration 
law, which allowed individuals who had arrived with a tourist visa to gain a work permit after presenting 
an employment contract to authorities.
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the European Union in 2007, but instead opened their markets to Romanians and 
Bulgarians only five to seven years later. 
Migration by Educational Attainment
Much of the earlier migration from poorer to richer European countries, such 
as the flow of southern European guest workers to Germany in the 1960s and 1970s, 
involved unskilled workers who provided cheap labor in construction, factory jobs, 
or low-paid service occupations. However, globalization and technical change have 
raised the relative demand for high-skilled workers, particularly in countries with a 
comparative advantage in skill-intensive goods. As a consequence, worldwide migra-
tion to high-income countries has become more skill-biased in recent decades (Kerr 
et al. 2016). 
Figure 4 shows the share of individuals with tertiary education in a country’s 
foreign resident population both for the years 2000 and 2015. During this period, 
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Figure 4 
Share of Tertiary-Educated Individuals among Foreign Residents in 2000 and 2015
Source: Eurostat (2020c, 2020f), OECD (2020).
Note: Countries are listed in declining order of GDP per capita in 2015. All data refers to citizens of 
European OECD member countries who live in another European OECD member country and for 
whom education is known. Estonia, Iceland, Latvia, and Slovenia are included only in 2015 but not in 
2000. Due to data availability, the initial share of foreigners with tertiary education is measured in 2005 
instead of 2000 for Germany.
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the increases were often large. Denmark, Luxembourg, Spain, and Switzerland all 
experienced a growth of the high-skill share among their foreign population by 
more than 12 percentage points. While the trends toward more highly educated 
immigrant populations is pervasive across countries, there remains large variation 
in the education levels of immigrants in different countries. For example, Spain 
(41 percent tertiary education share among immigrants) and the United Kingdom 
(39 percent) have relatively highly educated populations of foreigners, while 
Germany (19 percent), France (22 percent), and Italy (22 percent) have more low-
skilled foreigner populations.
Although immigrant education levels have increased, immigrants remain less 
educated than natives in most European countries. In 2019, the tertiary educa-
tion share in the EU-27 countries was 30 percent for foreign-born immigrants, but 
35 percent for natives (Eurostat 2020g). Conversely, the share of individuals with 
at most a lower secondary education was considerably larger among the migrants 
(33 percent) than among the natives (17 percent). 
A further differentiation of immigrants by source countries indicates that 
migrants within the European Economic Area possess slightly lower average educa-
tion levels than natives, but higher education levels than immigrants from outside 
the EEA (Eurostat 2020g). Drawing on data from the 2007–2009 European Labor 
Force Survey, Dustmann and Frattini (2011) further report that individuals who 
moved between western EU countries had higher average educational attainment 
than the natives, while migrants who moved from the eastern to the western EU 
countries had lower education levels. 
The data of Figure 4, which lists countries in declining order of their GDP per 
capita, suggest a weak positive correlation between a country’s high-skill immigrant 
share and its income level. Moreover, countries that had higher income levels in 
2000 also experienced a slightly larger growth in the high-skill immigrant share 
from 2000 to 2015. We thus find that migration not only flows from poorer to richer 
countries, but richer countries also tend to attract more skilled immigrants.
Equilibration of Labor Market Outcomes
The common European labor market can contribute to an equilibration of 
labor market outcomes across European countries. In theory, a complete removal 
of all mobility barriers should lead to factor price equalization. When production 
factors can be relocated without costs, the operation of market forces will attract 
workers to locations paying high wages and will induce firms to invest in locations 
where labor costs are low. In practice, however, markets are far from perfect. A 
broad set of mobility costs and frictions create substantial inertia. We discuss further 
below that even with open borders between European countries, obstacles to migra-
tion continue to exist due to different languages, heterogeneity in education, 
training and social security systems, as well as anti-immigrant attitudes of the native 
population and discrimination against immigrants. Given the presence of mobility 
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frictions, differences across countries in such dimensions as the skill composition of 
the labor force, industry composition, infrastructure, or institutional environment 
will continue to determine cross-country wage differences while making wage- and 
income-convergence a slow and long-lasting process; moreover, permanent differ-
ences in amenities offered by countries to workers and firms may inhibit full wage 
convergence.
Nonetheless, there is little doubt that the European integration process has 
substantially reduced mobility frictions, notably by giving foreign citizens within 
the European Economic Area the same legal access to a country’s labor market that 
domestic citizens have. Head and Mayer (in this symposium) estimate that mobility 
costs within Europe fell rapidly in the 1960s, while reductions in these costs were 
more modest during the past two decades. Indeed, more than one-half of the EEA’s 
current population live in the six founding members of the EEC for whom border-
free mobility already became possible in the 1960s, and more than three-quarters 
live in countries that were part of the common labor market by the mid-1990s. 
Much of the removal of mobility barriers in Europe thus already occurred several 
decades ago.
Recent Wage Convergence in the European Labor Market
We discuss below the wage convergence across European countries between 
2008 and 2018. Arguably the most important removal of mobility frictions during 
this period concerned the opening of the labor markets of the wealthier Western 
European countries to the citizens of the poorer Eastern European countries that 
have joined the European Economic Area since 2004. Therefore, one would, in 
particular, expect to see wage convergence between the Eastern and Western Euro-
pean countries. 
Of course, forces other than migration will also affect convergence in Euro-
pean wage and income levels. There was arguably a large potential for catch-up 
growth in the Eastern European countries following their transition from commu-
nism to capitalism 30 years ago that would have led to some convergence even 
absent the common labor market. Moreover, by joining the European Union, the 
Eastern member states also gained access to the free movement of goods, capital, 
and services, and support through the European Union’s spatial cohesion policy. 
That policy seeks to reduce economic disparities between countries and regions 
within the European Union. From 2014 to 2020, the European Union allocated 
about €645 billion, or one-third of its overall budget, to instruments such as subsi-
dized infrastructure projects that support that cohesion policy (as discussed in this 
journal by Von Ehrlich and Overman 2020). 
Yet despite these forces in favor of convergence, economic differences between 
the EU member countries remain remarkably large. In 2019, average labor costs in 
the European Union ranged from €6/hour in Bulgaria to €45/hour in Denmark 
(Eurostat 2020h). Although Denmark has the highest and Bulgaria has the lowest 
price level in the European Union, real wages still differ by a factor of 2.8 between 
the two countries (Eurostat 2020i).
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Here, we draw on microdata from EU-SILC (Statistics on Income and Living 
Conditions) to study convergence in real wages and in wages adjusted for skill levels. 
Our sample includes 253,894 workers in 2008 and 262,255 workers in 2018, who 
reside in 30 European countries. We regress, separately for each year, individuals’ 
real log gross annual earnings on country fixed effects, and a set of control variables 
that includes a quartic in age and indicators for sex, marital status, and highest 
educational degree obtained. Germany is the reference country; hence, the coeffi-
cients for country fixed effects indicate countries’ wage premia relative to Germany 
in the year under consideration.
Figure 5 plots coefficient estimates for the 2018 country fixed effects against 
those for the 2008 fixed effects, where we converted these effects from a log point 
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Convergence in Real Wages across Countries
Source:  SILC data and price level data from Eurostat (2020j, 2020k). 
Note: The figure indicates coefficient estimates for country fixed effects from year-specific regressions 
that relate individuals’ log annual real wage to country fixed effects and controls for a quartic in age, 
sex, marital status, and highest education degree obtained. Country fixed effect estimates have been 
converted from log points to percentage points. Germany is the reference country for the country fixed 
effects. All wages are converted to Euros and adjusted for price level differences across countries. For 
details of the regression, see the online Appendix available with this article at the JEP website.
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shows that there was convergence in real wage levels. Consider the case of Romania 
(“RO”) towards the bottom left corner of the figure. In 2008, the average Roma-
nian worker earned 64 percent less than the average worker in Germany. However, 
that gap had shrunk to 51 percent ten years later. Indeed, for all Eastern European 
members of the EEA, except Hungary, Latvia, and Slovenia, the country indicators 
lie above the 45-degree line, as shown in the lower-left portion of the figure. These 
countries reduced their wage penalty relative to Germany. By contrast, the indica-
tors for all Western European countries lie below the 45-degree line, as shown in 
the center and upper-right portion of the figure. Wage levels in these countries lost 
ground relative to Germany from 2008 to 2018. 
A linear regression fit through the point cloud (not shown in the figure) would 
have a slope of 0.64. The slope of less than one implies that national wage levels had 
a greater dispersion in 2008 than in 2018: a wage difference which existed between 
any pair of countries in 2008 would be predicted to have shrunk by one-third by 
2018.8 
These wage estimates are broadly in line with recent evidence on convergence 
in GDP per capita across European countries and regions. Montfort (2020) finds 
convergence in per capita incomes between 2000 and 2008, which has slowed down 
substantially thereafter. Since 2008, overall convergence within the EU-28 has been 
weak, with countries of Eastern Europe slowly catching up, while there was some 
divergence within the EU-15. In sum, large income differences remain.
Static Earnings Gains from Migration
The persistent and large earnings differences across European countries suggest 
that migration within Europe is associated with high earnings gains for migrants. 
To shed light on the order of magnitude of these gains, we undertake a simple 
accounting exercise. First, we calculate the difference in earnings levels between 
origin country i and destination country j, (wj − wi) for the year 2018, based on a 
regression of log real yearly earnings on worker characteristics and country fixed 
effects as in the analysis for Figure 5 above. Abstracting from the effects of immi-
grant selectivity (Borjas 1987) and immigrant assimilation (Chiswick 1978)—that 
is, the fact that immigrants typically face an earnings penalty initially and catch up 
only later on—differences in country fixed effects can serve as a measure for the 
earnings gain of a migrant moving from country i to country j. 
8 Details of the regression underlying Figure 5 and additional results are available in the online Appendix 
available with this article at the JEP website. In Appendix Figure A3, we repeat the same analysis based 
on an augmented cross-country wage regression that additionally controls for various characteristics of 
workers’ jobs: weekly work hours, detailed occupation, and industry of employment. That setup seeks to 
isolate differences in countries’ wage levels that cannot readily be explained by international differences 
in job types. Cross-country convergence is slightly weaker when we add these controls: a regression line 
through the point cloud of country fixed effect estimates has a slope of 0.68 rather than 0.64. Note that 
the estimated slope will be biased towards zero if countries’ wage differences relative to Germany are 
measured with error. Therefore, one might interpret the slope estimate as lower bound for its actual 
value.
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Second, we calculate the earnings gains from immigration for each origin-
destination pair (i, j) as the product M(i, j) · (wj − wi), where M(i, j) is the stock 
of migrants in destination j originating from country i.9 These earnings gains are 
static in the sense that they take wage levels as given, and abstract from any impact 
of migration on wages in the origin or destination countries.
Based on this calculation, we estimate that 12.7 million intra-EU migrant 
workers obtain an average earnings gain of about €6,500 per year each (all numbers 
adjusted by purchasing power parity throughout). The product of these numbers 
yields an aggregate static earnings gain from within-EU migration of €83.2 billion, 
or 0.5 percent of EU-wide GDP. The bulk of this benefit, €67.9 billion, accrues 
to migrants from Eastern Europe, whose earnings gains amount to 2.8 percent 
of eastern EU countries’ GDP. For Bulgaria, which is the poorest member 
country of the European Union, the static migration gain is largest at 8.0 percent 
of GDP. 
This basic calculation assumes that the gain from migrating from country to 
country is the same for all workers of a given broad education group. In reality, the 
potential gains from migration may, however, vary across workers, and it is plausible 
that those who stand to gain more will be more likely to migrate. By not taking into 
account this selection effect, one will tend to underestimate the gains from migra-
tion. In particular, while our simple calculation implies an earnings loss for every 
worker who moves from a richer to a poorer country, it is possible that at least some 
of these workers in reality earn more in the low-wage host-country than in their 
high-wage home-country. If we only take into account migration flows from poorer 
to richer countries, the EU-wide gains from migration are indeed larger, amounting 
to €97.4 billion or 0.6 percent of EU GDP. For eastern EU countries, the gains from 
migration are, unsurprisingly, barely affected, because almost all migrants from 
Eastern Europe move to a richer EU country.
Another potential source of bias in our baseline calculation stems from the 
fact that foreign citizens often obtain lower wages in a destination country than 
domestic citizens. By ignoring that pattern, one will tend to overestimate the earn-
ings gains from migration. Indeed, when we account for such wage penalties by 
calculating separate wage levels in a country for domestic and foreign citizens, then 
the gains from migration are substantially smaller. They amount to 0.2 percent of 
EU GDP for EU-wide migration, to 1.7 percent of GDP for the member states in 
Eastern Europe, and to 5.7 percent of GDP for the poorest country, Bulgaria. 
Clemens (2011) in this journal reviews a broader literature on the potential 
gains from reducing worldwide barriers to labor mobility. While a complete removal 
of such barriers could generate gains of more than 100 percent of worldwide GDP 
9  We calculate country-specific wage premia and earnings gains separately for migrants with and without 
tertiary education. The gains are adjusted by purchasing power parity exchange rates. Online Appendix 
Figure A4 shows that in many countries, wage differences relative to Germany are larger for highly 
educated workers than for less educated ones. Our calculation also takes into account that earnings 
gains from migration accrue not to all migrants, but only to working-age individuals who are employed. 
The online Appendix provides further detail on this computation of gains from migration.
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according to some estimates, the realization of such gains would require that more 
than half of the world population moves to another country. With partial reduc-
tions of mobility barriers that lead to a migration of about 1–2 percent of the world 
population, world GDP could still grow by about 1–2 percent. In comparing such 
calculations to migration gains for Europe, it is important to note that income 
differentials within Europe are much smaller than worldwide, which leads to smaller 
potential gains from migration. 
Indeed, our simple quantification of migration gains can be used to highlight 
how gains from migration depend on both migration rates and earnings differences 
between countries. Consider first the case of Bulgaria. The number of Bulgarian 
workers in other EU countries corresponds to about 8 percent of Bulgaria’s popu-
lation, and the average migration gain per Bulgarian worker is about equal to the 
country’s per-capita GDP. As a consequence, we obtain a migration gain of 8 percent 
of GDP for Bulgaria in our baseline calculation. When we look instead at the entire 
European Union, both the fraction of migrant workers (about 2.5 percent) and the 
average gain per worker (about 20 percent of per-capita EU GDP) are substantially 
lower than in the Bulgarian case, and in combination result in the much smaller 
migration benefit of 0.5 percent of EU GDP.
Earnings Effects of Immigration on Host-Country Wages
The simple accounting exercise above calculated earnings gains from within-
EU migration based on the assumption that wages in the involved countries are not 
themselves affected by immigration. This is a strong assumption, but perhaps some-
what less unreasonable given the large and highly persistent cross-country variation 
in real wages across European countries.
One possible explanation for that persistence in wage differentials is that the 
labor flows within the common European labor market are not large enough to 
create a stronger convergence in wage levels. Another possible explanation is that 
labor markets adjust to immigration primarily through an adjustment of employ-
ment, rather than an adjustment of wages. For example, Glitz (2012) looks at the 
large immigration flow into Germany of 2.8 million ethnic Germans from Eastern 
Europe and the former Soviet Union during the 1990s and early 2000s. He finds no 
effect on wages, but a large employment effect: for every ten immigrants who find a 
job, three native workers become unemployed. A related study by Dustmann, Schön-
berg, and Stuhler (2017) analyzes a local labor supply shock in a German border 
region when workers from nearby Czechia were allowed to enter the country. It 
finds a moderate decline in the German wage but a large negative response in local 
native employment. 
The intuitive conjecture that migration should equilibrate wages and employ-
ment rates rests on the implicit assumptions that labor is homogeneous and that 
labor demand is constant. But if labor is heterogeneous and there is little substitut-
ability between immigrant and native workers, then a migrant inflow will generate 
little downward pressure for the wages of natives. Conversely, immigrants may 
contribute to firm growth by filling important labor shortages or by contributing 
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to innovation, in which case, immigration may trigger an increase in labor demand 
that raises the native wage level. 
With these ideas in mind, certain areas of Switzerland offer an interesting 
case study for the effects of European labor market integration. The Swiss had 
rejected membership in the European Economic Area in a 1992 referendum, and 
only became part of the common European labor market in 2005 after a set of 
bilateral agreements with the European Union. From 2000 to 2019, immigration 
increased the share of foreigners in the Swiss workforce by more than 8 percentage 
points. This surge in immigrant workers included many workers who reside in 
neighboring regions of Italy, France, and Germany, and who commute daily to 
Switzerland in order to take advantage of the elevated Swiss wages. The number 
of workers employed in Switzerland but residing in a neighboring country almost 
tripled since 2000 and now accounts for an astonishing 6.5 percent of the Swiss 
labor force. 
Cross-border work in Switzerland is particularly important in the cantons of 
Geneva near the French border and Ticino near the Italian border, where cross-
border workers account for 26 and 29 percent of all workers in those cantons, 
respectively. In these cases, frictions to cross-border labor mobility seem very limited. 
In particular, there are no restrictions arising from language differences (Geneva is 
a French-speaking canton; Ticino is an Italian-speaking canton), and cross-border 
transportation systems are well developed. Several recent studies explore how the 
increase in cross-border work affected the local labor markets of both Switzerland, 
where labor supply increased dramatically, as well as the border regions of France 
and Italy, which lost many workers to Switzerland.
Beerli et al. (2021) find that the increase in cross-border workers in the most 
strongly exposed border regions of Switzerland left wages and employment of 
native Swiss workers largely unchanged. Indeed, wages of university-educated 
natives even increased. It appears that migration allowed highly productive and 
skill-intensive firms to close their labor shortages. Conversely, the French and 
Italian border regions lost a sizeable fraction of their employees to Swiss firms. 
For the French border regions, Hafner (2021) finds that the wages of low-
skilled workers were slightly rising, while wages of high-skilled workers remained 
unaffected. Dicarlo (2020) shows that Italian firms in the border region faced 
substantial labor shortages after large numbers of Italian workers took up jobs in 
nearby Switzerland. In particular, Italian firms in high-skill sectors in the border 
region struggled to compensate for this loss in labor supply. Nevertheless, wages 
in these firms declined, most likely because the most productive workers went to 
Switzerland. 
Taken together, these papers suggest that labor market integration between 
Switzerland and its neighbors did not decrease—and perhaps even increased—the 
wage differences across national borders. Various studies have also found positive 
wage effects of immigrants on natives in other European countries. For instance, 
Dustmann, Frattini, and Preston (2013) find that, on average, immigration in the 
UK slightly increased the average wage of native workers, though wages responded 
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differentially along the wage distribution (some wage declines below the twen-
tieth percentile of the wage distribution but modest wage gains in the upper ranks 
of the distribution). Ortega and Verdugo (2014) show that immigration into France 
raised the wage of French workers by fostering a reallocation of the native workers to 
better-paying occupations.
The general message from all these studies is that migration flows may have 
surprisingly weak effects on wages. Despite increasing migration flows within 
Europe, an equilibration of wage levels across countries does not seem near.
Obstacles to Migration and European Labor Market Integration
The labor market of the European Economic Area remains considerably less 
integrated than the US labor market and has much lower migration rates. A prox-
imate reason for these relatively modest migration rates in Europe is that labor 
market outcomes for migrants are often worse than those of similarly educated 
natives. Some citizens of Europe’s poorer countries would likely struggle to obtain 
adequate jobs if they moved to a richer country, and their financial gain from moving 
would thus be considerably smaller than suggested by the large international wage 
differences indicated in Figure 5. Algan et al. (2011) review the labor market perfor-
mance of immigrants in Europe’s three largest economies—Germany, France, and 
the United Kingdom—and conclude that immigrants do worse than natives in 
terms of employment rates and earnings, after controlling for education, potential 
experience and regional location. The immigrant-native gaps appear quite persis-
tent across first- and second-generation immigrants (that is, native-born children of 
foreign-born parents). 
Importantly, immigrants’ labor market performance varies widely across immi-
grant groups. While migrants from other Western European countries have fairly 
similar outcomes than natives, very large gaps exist for immigrants from outside 
Europe of different races and ethnicities, such as Africans in France, or Bangla-
deshis and Pakistanis in the United Kingdom. Eastern Europeans, and in some cases 
southern Europeans such as Greeks or Italians in Germany, also do worse than the 
natives. Calmfors and Sánchez Gassen (2019) show that immigrants’ employment 
prospects are substantially below those of natives even in the egalitarian Nordic 
countries.
Language and Culture
Europe’s remarkably large heterogeneity in languages is one reason why 
immigrants may struggle to gain a foothold in another country’s labor market. 
The European Union alone lists 24 different official languages, and the non-EU 
members of the common labor market add another three. A lack of proficiency 
in the destination country’s language not only limits immigrants’ ability to find 
jobs quickly but can also reduce productivity in the workplace and social inclusion. 
A large literature has documented that poor language proficiency has a sizable 
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negative effect on labor earnings of immigrants (Chiswick and Miller 2014). Other 
research suggests that language differences between the origin and destination 
countries constitute a barrier for migration. Adserà and Pytliková (2015) show that 
in a panel of OECD countries, migration flows are stronger between countries that 
share the same language. Moreover, English-speaking countries generally receive 
greater migrant inflows, which is likely due to the widespread teaching of English 
as a foreign language. In the European Union, 96 percent of all students in upper 
secondary education learn English as a foreign language, while the fractions of 
students learning Spanish, French, and German are just 26 percent, 22 percent, 
and 20 percent, respectively (Eurostat 2020g). 
Language can also more broadly proxy for local culture, and migrants across 
language borders may have to learn not only a new language but also to famil-
iarize themselves with local practices of interpersonal interaction and labor market 
behavior. Consistent with such an interpretation of language as a proxy for culture, 
Eugster et al. (2017) show that workers’ job search behavior differs notably across 
nearby German-speaking and French-speaking regions in Switzerland that share the 
same formal labor market institutions.
Education, Training, and Social Security
Certain institutional features may also hinder the smooth integration of immi-
grants into host country labor markets. European education and occupational 
training systems are organized and administered at the national level. Because these 
systems differ across countries, skilled immigrants often face limitations to enter the 
occupation in which they were trained at home. In some cases, employers may have 
difficulty assessing educational credentials that were acquired abroad; in others, 
occupational licensing rules make it difficult to get formal recognition of occupa-
tional certificates acquired abroad. 
Tertiary education is one area where standards have been harmonized. The 
1999 Bologna declaration was signed by 29 European countries (the EU-28 except 
Cyprus, plus Norway and Switzerland). In follow-up agreements, the “Bologna 
process” was opened to other countries, including those of the former Soviet 
Union, former Yugoslavia, and Turkey, and now includes 48 countries that form 
the European Higher Education Area. In this agreement, countries coordinated on 
adopting a system of comparable degrees, similar study cycles (undergraduate/grad-
uate), and a system of portable study credits. Furthermore, there is an agreement to 
promote international mobility of students and teaching staff and to harmonize the 
standards and quality of study programs (Huisman et al. 2012). By 2018, 1.3 million 
students enrolled in tertiary programs across the EU-27 came from abroad, with 
44 percent coming from other European countries. Germany, France, Italy, and the 
Netherlands attracted more than half of these foreign students (Eurostat 2020g). 
EU legislation has also sought to standardize and facilitate the process of 
occupational recognition, yet significant barriers remain. Koumenta et al. (2014) 
document that access to more than 800 occupations is regulated in at least one 
EU member state, with these occupations covering up to 24 percent of the EU 
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labor force. They show that intra-EU migrants are less likely than natives to enter 
a profession subject to licensing. Further analyses show that occupational recogni-
tion has a significant effect on wages. Brücker et al. (2020), studying the impact of 
occupational recognition in Germany, find that three years after obtaining recogni-
tion of their occupational credentials, immigrants earn 20 percent higher wages 
and are 25 percent more likely to be employed than similar immigrants who never 
applied for recognition.10 Obstacles to occupational recognition likely contribute 
to  occupational downgrading, where immigrants work in jobs that are inferior to 
their previous education and labor market experience (Dustmann, Frattini, and 
Preston 2013).
An additional mobility barrier concerns the large heterogeneity in social insur-
ance rights across European countries. These rights—including old-age pensions, 
unemployment payments, and government-financed healthcare services—are 
determined at the national level, and programs differ strongly across countries. 
For migrants, it is not always obvious whether rights acquired in one country are 
transferable to another country. For instance, a worker who moves frequently across 
countries and works for only short periods in each of them may not satisfy any 
country’s minimum qualifying period that is required to gain access to an old-age 
pension. “Coordination Regulations” have been established to facilitate the porta-
bility of social insurance rights across countries and to prohibit discrimination 
against immigrants or against return migrants who have since left a country (Euro-
pean Commission 2019).
Discrimination and Anti-immigrant Attitudes
Another explanation for immigrants’ relative lack of labor market success is 
discrimination in the labor market. There is ample evidence from Europe and else-
where for discrimination against racial and ethnic minorities in the labor market, 
which is reviewed in recent surveys by Bertrand and Duflo (2017) and Neumark 
(2018). 
In the context of migration within Europe, differences in national origins are 
not necessarily visible from workers’ physiques (used in audit studies of in-person 
job applicants) or from workers’ names (in correspondence studies based on 
submissions of written job applications). Thus, one recent study that explicitly 
investigates discrimination by nationality uses data from an online platform of 
the Swiss public employment service that connects job seekers with recruiters 
(Hangartner, Kopp, and Siegenthaler 2021). On this platform, recruiters observe 
not only the names but also the nationalities and language skills of job seekers. 
Holding constant other observables, job seekers of non-European origin are 13 
to 19 percent less likely to be contacted by recruiters than Swiss nationals. For 
migrants within the common European labor market, penalties are smaller and 
range from zero for southern Europeans (which include Italians who form the 
10 In a US context, Kleiner and Krueger (2013) estimate that 29 percent of jobs are subject to occupation 
licensing rules and that licensing is associated with 18 percent higher wages.
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largest group of foreigners in Switzerland) to 6 percent, both for immigrants from 
the northwest and east of the continent. Most of these penalties disappear when 
immigrants are naturalized, although recruiters may still infer the foreign roots of 
applicants based on their names and language skills in some cases (Kopp, Siegent-
haler, and Hangartner 2020). The nationality of job applicants thus appears 
to play an important role in labor market discrimination, rather than just the 
ethnicity. Åslund, Hensvik, and Nordström Skans (2014) additionally show that 
hiring chances of immigrants in Sweden are significantly lower in firms whose 
managers are born in Sweden instead of abroad, which suggests that discrimina-
tion may result from homophily. 
The free migration of labor within Europe is arguably the most politically 
controversial element of the common European market. Alfano et al. (2016) 
argue that the United Kingdom’s lack of control over immigration from the 
European Economic Area became the single most important argument in favor 
of the “Brexit” referendum, which eventually led to the United Kingdom’s exit 
from the common market. However, support for Brexit was highest not in those 
regions that had received the most immigration in previous years, but in regions 
that experienced economic decline due to rising international trade competition 
(Colantone and Stanig 2018). 
While it is unclear whether immigration has adverse impacts on the labor 
market outcomes of natives (Dustmann, Schönberg, and Stuhler 2016), migrants 
affect natives also by changing the composition of nationalities, languages, and 
cultures in neighborhoods, workplaces and schools. Card, Dustmann, and Preston 
(2012) find that concerns related to such compositional amenities are 2–5 times 
more important than concerns about the labor market in order to explain people’s 
attitudes towards migrants. 
Despite the United Kingdom’s exit from the common market and the rise of anti-
immigrant sentiment in some European countries, attitudes of the general public 
towards immigration have not become more skeptical during the last two decades in 
most countries. We compiled data from the 2004 and 2018 European Social Survey, 
which asked respondents “to what extent do you think your country should allow 
people of the same race or ethnic group as most of your country’s people to come 
and live here?” The fraction of survey respondents who answered either “allow many” 
or “allow some” (instead of “allow few” or “allow none”) increased in 13 out of 14 
Western European countries, from an average of 66 to 77 percent, with declining 
support for immigration being observed only in Italy. In the six countries of Eastern 
Europe included in the surveys, support for immigration changed modestly from 
an average of 59 to 58 percent, with declines in Czechia, Poland, and Slovakia (for 
details of the survey results, see online Appendix Figure A5). 
Inflexible Domestic Labor Markets
While obstacles to labor migration across European countries exist, it is worth 
pointing out that job-to-job mobility is also quite low within many European coun-
tries. The same reasons that prevent workers from changing jobs domestically 
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may also keep them from moving internationally. In particular, southern Euro-
pean countries tend to have strict employment protection regulations that require 
employers to pay sizable compensations to workers in case of layoffs. Such measures 
strongly reduce worker mobility across jobs (Martin and Scarpetta 2012). Alesina 
et al. (2015) also argue that the cultures of southern European countries value 
close family ties more strongly than cultures in northern European or Anglo-Saxon 
countries. In a culture with strong family ties, many adults do not want to move far 
away from their parents and relatives, which limits spatial mobility even if migration 
would be financially gainful.
Conclusions
We are still far from a common European labor market. In a 2014 survey 
conducted by the German think tank IZA, among 284 European labor econo-
mists, nearly three-quarters disagreed with the statement that “the single European 
labor market is largely achieved” (Krause-Pilatus, Rinne, and Zimmermann 2014). 
Despite the removal of legal barriers to labor mobility, large differences in labor 
market outcomes across European countries remain. 
Of course, most domestic labor markets—including the US labor market—are 
segmented into geographic local labor markets where localized shocks can lead 
to fairly persistent differentials in wage and unemployment levels (Moretti 2011; 
Autor, Dorn, and Hanson 2021). However, migration rates within the European 
labor market are much smaller than in the United States, despite larger geographic 
differentials in labor market outcomes across European regions, and notwith-
standing that Europe covers a larger population distributed over a much smaller 
land area. As noted, some of the remaining obstacles to a more integrated European 
labor market include heterogeneity of Europe in terms of languages and cultures; 
national regulations related to education, training, and employment conditions; 
and discrimination against migrants.
National borders are no longer legal barriers to labor migration, but they remain 
important for Europeans’ self-identification. Four in seven EU citizens (57 percent) 
feel very attached to their own country, while only one in seven (14 percent) feel 
very attached to the European Union (European Commission 2018). The United 
Kingdom’s departure from the common market—which was partly driven by 
concerns about migration—makes clear that further European labor market inte-
gration cannot be taken for granted. While there is currently no indication that 
other countries will soon follow the United Kingdom’s path of leaving the European 
Union, it is also unlikely that the European labor market will substantially grow over 
the next decade through the accession of new member states. The European Union 
has opened membership negotiations with five countries, but the negotiations with 
the largest candidate country (Turkey) have now been frozen for many years, and 
the other four countries (Albania, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia) 
would add less than 3 percent to the population of the European Economic Area. A 
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further integration of the European labor market may thus more likely result from 
the European Union’s efforts to harmonize or coordinate national regulations in 
order to reduce obstacles to migration, and from continued migration of workers 
from Eastern to Western Europe.
■ We thank Thomas Brunnschweiler for outstanding research assistance. Maps showing 
administrative boundaries are ©EuroGeographics.
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